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NOTE
Liability of Directors Under the Federal
Securities Code
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1978, Reporter Louis Loss presented the Proposed Official
Draft of the Federal Securities Code [Code]" to the fifty-fifth annual meeting of the American Law Institute for approval by the
membership. 2 The Code-the product of nine years of work by the
Reporter and the Consultantss-is a comprehensive regulatory
package proposed as a replacement for the confusing array of statutes and rules that currently regulate securities. 4 Although intended as a codification of existing law and strongly influenced by
it, the Code differs substantially in several substantive areas from
the current scheme.5 Perhaps the most significant change effected
by the Code is the shift in emphasis away from the current registration requirements of the Securities Act of 1933 [1933 Act]. Instead of the registration of each offering of a security via a separate
registration statement, the Code substitutes a single initial registration of companies followed by the registrant's periodic disclosures in order to provide investors with continuous current information.' To support this change, the Reporter proposed that civil
1. ALI FED. SEC. CODE (Proposed Official Draft, 1978) [hereinafter cited as 1978
Draft].
2. The Code is expected to be introduced in Congress in the fall of 1980. 558 SEC. REG.
& L. REP. (BNA) A-1 (1980).
3. 55 ALI PROCEEDINGS 333 (1978) (remarks of Professor Louis Loss).
4. Bialkin, The Issuer Registrationand Distribution Provisionsof the Proposed Federal Securities Code, 30 VAND. L. REV. 327, 329-30 (1977); Loss, Introduction: The Federal
Securities Code-Its Purpose, Plan, and Progress, 30 VAND. L. REV. 315, 315-19 (1977).
5. See generally W. PAINTER, THE FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE (1979); ABA Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, ALI Proposed Federal
Securities Code, 34 Bus. LAW. 345 (1978); Lowenfels, The Case Against the Proposed Federal Securities Code, 65 VA. L. REV. 615 (1979); Symposium: The American Law Institute's
Proposed Federal Securities Code (pt. 1), 30 VAND. L. REV. 311 (1977); Symposium: The
American Law Institute's Proposed Federal Securities Code (pt. 2), 32 VAND. L. REV. 455
(1979).
6. Loss, supra note 4, at 321. The Code requires registered companies to file and send
to all registered shareholders annual and quarterly reports as required by the Securities and
Exchange Commission [hereinafter referred to as the SEC]. 1978 Draft, supra note 1, § 602.
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liability provisions similar to those in effect under section 11 of the
1933 Act accompany the reporting requirements of the Code.
Under section 1704 of the proposed Code, the registrant, its officers, its directors, and participating experts are jointly and severally liable for misrepresentations or mistakes of material fact in
the periodic reports.7 Any person who purchased a security of the
registrant after the statement was filed or became effective has
standing to sue under section 1704.8 The section also adopts the
so-called due diligence requirement of section 11 by allowing a defendant to avoid liability only by proving that, after a reasonable
investigation, he reasonably believed the veracity of the registration statements.9 In denying the defendant the defense of good
faith and imposing upon him the additional burden of proving the
plaintiff's knowledge of the defect or failure to rely on the statement, the Code imposes a negligence standard of liability that approaches strict liability.' 0 Although section 11 of the 1933 Act provides the basis for section 1704,1" the new section extends liability
well beyond the scope of the present section. As the Note to section 1704 acknowledges, "[t]here is an inevitable tension between
[section] 11's affirmative duty of registration as applied on an occasional 'one-shot' basis to a registration statement and the idea of
continuous disclosure."'" Unquestionably, the greatly expanded
scope of the disclosure requirements proposed in section 1704
would be a significant step in the evolution of securities regulation.
When the membership of the American Law Institute [ALI]
turned to consider section 1704, the debate on the merits of the
provision proved to be particularly divisive.' 3 The vote on the issue, ninety-five to ninety-four in favor of retaining the section as
drafted, 4 was the closest that Professor Wechsler could recall in
his sixteen years as director of the ALI.15 In view of the closeness
of the vote, Reporter Loss offered a compromise position excluding
outside directors from the scope of section 1704 and its burdensome due diligence standard. He proposed placing them instead
7. 1978 Draft, supra note 1, § 1704(b). See note 144 infra and accompanying text.
8. 1978 Draft, supra note 1, § 1704(c).
9. Id. § 1704(f) and (g). See notes 151, 153-55 infra and accompanying text.
10. 55 ALI PROCEEDINGS 347 (remarks of Reporter Louis Loss).

11. Id. at 347-48.
12. 1978 Draft, supra note 1, § 1704 Note (1) at 571.
13. See, e.g., 55 ALI PROCEEDINGS 347 (remarks of Dean David Ruder and of Professor
Homer Kripke).
14. Id. at 376.
15. Id. at 464 (remarks of Director Wechsler).
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within section 1705,6 which imposes liability only for misrepresentations made with scienter. 17 Although the membership at the 1978
meeting agreed to present the Code to Congress as drafted with
the compromise in brackets, the continued debate over the form of
the presentation' s persuaded the Reporter to withdraw the liability
issue from the Code entirely. At the 1979 meeting, Reporter Loss
stated that "[c]ivil liability has been the only issue in the Code
that has split consultants, advisers, the ABA Committee [on Federal Regulation of Securities], and this House." 9 He therefore requested that the ALI present the Code to Congress without advocating any standard of liability for misleading statements or
omissions in periodic reports. The membership agreed, and the
Code will present several suggested alternatives without intimating
that any one is preferable.2 0
In striking contrast to the attention that the liability formula
in sections 1704 and 1705 received, section 1724, the provision on
contribution and indemnification,2 1 passed unnoticed.2 2 Of necessity, however, the treatment of contribution and indemnification
relates directly to the practical impact of any liability provision.
Although the lack of attention is probably attributable to the fact
that the Code, which is intended primarily as a codification, does
16. Id. at 402-03 (remarks of Reporter Louis Loss).
17. 1978 Draft, supra note 1, § 1705(a). See notes 159-61 infra and accompanying text.
18. 504 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-9 (1979). See, e.g., Remarks of Professor Loss
and Dean Ruder, Meeting of the ABA Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, Chicago, Ill. (Oct. 13, 1978), summarized in MINUTES OF THE MEETING 28-29 (1978).
19. 504 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-9 (1979).
20. Id. During the summer and into the fall of 1980, however, there were ongoing discussions between Reporter Loss, other members of the ALI, and the staff of the SEC with a
view toward reaching compromise positions on certain aspects of the proposed Code. On
September 18, 1980 the SEC, in SEC Release No. 33-6242, announced its support for the
proposed Code as revised to incorporate certain compromises. See 571 SEc. REG. & L. REP.
(BNA) A-1 (1980). Some of these compromises affect the civil liability provisions of the
Code. It is not clear at this time, however, whether any compromises reached will be
presented to the ALI for a formal vote or will simply be sent to Congress in the fall for
consideration along with the current reading of the Code.
As understood, one compromise affects §§ 1704(a), 1705(a)(I), and 1705(0 concerning
civil liability for the filing of annual "10-K" reports. These proposals reflect a compromise
of the question whether civil liability with respect to the "10-K" report should be governed
by § 1704 or § 1705. Under the compromise, the "10-K" is subjected, in effect, to § 1704type liability so far as persons liable and defendant's burden of proof are concerned, but to
§ 1705-type liability to the extent that the defendant's burden of proof is satisfied if he
establishes only lack of scienter rather than lack of due care as in § 1704.
21. 1978 Draft, supra note 1, § 1724(d)-(f). See notes 181-86 infra and accompanying
text.
22. 55 ALI PROCEEDINGS 759 (1978) (Index to discussion of 1978 Draft sections).
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little to disturb the status quo in the area of contribution and indemnification, the oversight is unfortunate. It is the thesis of this
Note that, had the membership focused on indemnification and
contribution, it could have arrived at a satisfactory compromise on
director liability under section 1704 while improving the Code's
treatment of indemnification and contribution. Furthermore, if the
objective of section 1704 liability is to achieve an in terrorem effect, it is internally inconsistent not to harmonize that section with
the liability shifting effect of contribution and indemnification.23
II.

BACKGROUND

A. Securities Act of 1933
Section 11 of the 1933 Act, modeled on the British Companies
Act of 1924, was also the focus of considerable disagreement about
the wisdom of imposing burdensome obligations and sanctions on
officers and directors.2 ' The Companies Act is, in effect, the father
of section 11 and the grandfather of section 1704 of the proposed
Federal Securities Code. Originally enacted as the English Director's Liability Act of 1890, the Companies Act required disclosure
as a mechanism to protect investors.2 5 Although similar to section
11 in many respects, the British Act did not impose liability on
experts and did not permit the plaintiff to recover without affirmatively proving reliance. 26 Notwithstanding the fact that the Companies Act standards had satisfied the British investment community for over forty years, American businessmen considered its
offspring, the 1933 Act, "terrifying. ' '27 Perhaps this fear was attrib-

23. Commentators have long recognized that the liability provisions of the federal securities laws are imposed primarily for their in terrorem effect. See Dooley, The Effects of
Civil Liability on Investment Banking and the New Issues Market, 58 VA. L. REv. 776, 809
(1972); Douglas & Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 YALE L.J. 171, 173 (1933);
Shulman, Civil Liabilities and the Securities Act, 43 YALE L.J. 227, 227 (1933); Note, The
Role of Contributionin Determining Underwriters' Liability Under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, 63 VA. L. REv. 79, 81 (1977).
24. 3 L. Loss, SECURTms REGULATON 1684 (2d ed. 1961 & Supp. 1969) (citing Douglas

& Bates, supra note 19, at 171); Ballantine, Amending the Federal SecuritiesAct, 20 A.B.A.
J. 85 (1934); Dean, The Federal Securities Act: I, FORTUNE, Aug. 1933, at 50; Seligman,
Amend The Federal Securities Act, ATLANTIC

MoNTHLY,

Mar. 1934, at 370.

25. Folk, Civil Liabilities Under the Federal Securities Acts: The BarChris Case (pt.
1), 55 VA. L. REv. 1, 14 (1969). The English Directors' Liability Act of 1890, 53 & 54 VICT.,

c. 64, § 3 (1890), was passed in response to the inequitable result in a securities fraud case,
Derry v. Peek, 14 App. Cas. 337 (1889), decided the preceeding year. Folk, supra this note,
at 14.
26.
27.

Id.
78

CONG.

REC. 8669 (1934), cited in Folk, supra note 25, at 19 n.117.
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utable to the absence of a reliance requirement for recovery under
the Act, but it probably stemmed from the tremendous change
that the Act effected in the prevalent laissez-faire attitude of the
1920's.
Section 5 of the 1933 Act requires an issuer of securities to
provide a prospectus detailing information regarding the security
and the issuer.2 8 Congress felt that the prospectus would provide a
prospective purchaser of securities with a source of information
that would enable him to make an intelligent decision whether to
purchase. 9 To provide an enforcement mechanism for insuring accurate disclosure, the Act grants a private right of action in section
11 to persons who purchased securities based on a false and misleading statement in the prospectus. Section 11(a) imposes liability
on the following: first, every person who signed the registration
statement, including the issuer, its principal officer or officers, its
principal financial officer, its comptroller or principal accounting
officer, and the majority of its board of directors; 0 second, every
person who was a director when the defective material was filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission [Commission];
third, every person who consented to nomination for directorship;
fourth, every expert, such as an accountant or engineer, whose expert opinion was contained in the statement with his consent; and
last, every underwriter of the security. 1 The Act, as originally
passed, imposed liability on these persons, regardless of reliance by
the plaintiff or causation, unless the defendant proved that the
plaintiff knew of the defect when he purchased the security.3 2 Furthermore, the statute of limitations permitted actions to be instituted for two years from the date the plaintiff discovered or should
have discovered the defective prospectus, up to ten years from the
date of sale. Thus, for a period of ten years, a director risked
liability to any purchaser regardless of whether the mistake or
omission actually influenced the purchaser's decision to buy.3 4 A
director could successfully defend only by showing that he had
made a reasonable investigation that led him to reasonably believe
in the accuracy and completeness of the statements or that, either
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

15 U.S.C. § 77e (1976).
1 L. Loss, supra note 24, at 121-28.
Securities Act of 1933 § 6(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77f(a) (1976).
Securities Act of 1933 § 11(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1976).
3 L. Loss, supra note 24, at 1724-25.
Id. at 1743.
Dooley, supra note 23, at 802.
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prior to or upon discovering the defect in the statement, he had
disassociated himself from the issuer and advised the Commission.3 5 The standard of care necessary.to satisfy the reasonable investigation defense under the original 1933 Act was that required
of a fiduciary."
The liability provisions of the 1933 Act met with heavy criticism in the business community. Amidst allegations that it was inhibiting new offerings and that it was partly responsible for the
failure of the stock market to recover from the 1929 crash, Congress, as part of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 [1934 Act],
amended section 11.37 The amendments reduced the statute of lim-

itations for a section 11 cause of action under the 1933 Act from
two and ten years to one and three years.38 The 1934 Act also added a provision requiring section 11 plaintiffs who purchased more
than a year after the initial offering to prove reliance if the issuer
made an earnings statement covering a period of at least a year
following the effective date generally available.' Finally, the
amendments decreased the standard of care necessary to satisfy
the reasonable investigation defense for directors by substituting a
"prudent man in the management of his own property" standard
in place of the original fiduciary care language. 0 Although the
amendments were undoubtedly a meaningful concession to the
business interests opposing the liability provisions of the 1933 Act,
the retreat was quite restricted. Even after the amendments, directors remained exposed to broad liability for failure to diligently review a prospectus. 1
Despite this expansive exposure to liability, the number of
cases brought under section 11 has been surprisingly limited. In his
1961 treatise, Professor Loss noted that, despite charges that the
section would "stifle legitimate financing,

42

it had produced only

two reported recoveries in nearly twenty-eight years.4' Although
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

3 L. Loss, supra note 24, at 1724.
Hanna, The Securities Act of 1934, 23 CALIF. L.
Dooley, supra note 23, at 805.
3 L. Loss, supra note 24, at 1742.
Id. at 1725; Hanna, supra note 36, at 7.
Hanna, supra note 36, at 7.
See text accompanying notes 46-71 infra.
3 L. Loss, supra note 24, at 1721.

REV.

1, 7 (1934).

43. The reasons for this are probably threefold. First, the statute of limitations is
quite short. Second, many cases are settled out of court. Last, rule 10b-5 has provided many

plaintiffs with an alternative cause of action.
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section 11 actions have become more frequent in recent years,"" apparently only two reported decisions have imposed liability on directors under section 11-Escott v. BarChris Construction Corp.'5
46
and Feit v. Leasco Data ProcessingEquipment Co.
BarChrisarose from the sale of debentures pursuant to a misleading registration statement by a bowling alley construction corporation that defaulted on the debentures and went bankrupt a
year later. 7 The purchasers of the debentures, asserting that the
registration statement contained material omissions and false
statements, sued the issuer, its officers and directors, the underwriters, and the auditors. 8 Of the nine directors sued, five were
BarChris officers, one was its outside counsel, another was a partner in the lead underwriting firm, and two were otherwise unconnected with BarChris. 49 Each director asserted that he had fulfilled
his obligation to conduct a reasonable investigation and therefore
was absolved from liability under section 11.50 The court, in con44. See 7 L. Loss, SEcuRrrixs REGULATION 3823-24 (Supp. 1969) (citing 17 section 11
actions between 1961 and 1969). See also Kroll, Some Reflections on Indemnification Provisions and S.E.C. Liability Insurance in the Light of BarChris and Globus, 24 Bus. LAW. 681
(1969).
45. 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
46. 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
47. In the late 1950s bowling experienced a dramatic increase in popularity, affording
BarChris a spectacular increase in its bowling alley construction business. BarChris had traditionally played a central role in financing the construction of each facility. The debenture
issue arose because this assumption of the construction finance burden by BarChris created
a great need for additional capital. The issue became effective in May 1961 and, shortly
thereafter, the bottom fell out of the bowling market. Faced with declining sales and customer defaults, BarChris defaulted on the debentures and filed for bankruptcy a year later.
283 F. Supp. at 653-54.
48. Plaintiffs sued exclusively under section 11(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15
U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1976).
49. The five officers were Vitolo, the president; Russo, the executive vice president;
Pugliese, the vice president; Kircher, the treasurer; and Birnbaum, the secretary. Birnbaum
also served as BarChris' in-house counsel. The outside counsel to BarChris was Grant, a
member of the firm of Perkins, Daniels, McCormack & Collins. Defendant Coleman was a
partner in Drexel & Co., the lead underwriter and also a defendant. The two outside directors were defendants Auslander and Rose. Auslander, chairman of a local bank, had been
led to believe that the directorship would result in substantial deposits by BarChris in his
bank. Rose was a civil engineer who had worked on BarChris' books as an employee of its
auditor. Other defendants in the suit were the auditor, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., and
the seven other members of the underwriting group. Id. at 652, 687, 689.
50. Section 11(b)(3) provides a defense with respect to any part of the registration
statement not made by or based on an expert's evaluation if the defendant can prove that
"he had, after reasonable investigation, reasonable ground to believe and did believe, at the
time such part of the registration statement became effective, that the statements therein
were true and that there was no omission to state a material fact required to be stated
therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading. . . ... This affirmative
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sidering the due diligence defense of each director, appeared to
hold the directors to different levels of diligence depending upon
their position and responsibilities. 1
In discussing the officer-directors, the court held the chief executive officer, the two founder-directors, and the chief financial
officer to a standard of care approximating strict liability. The
court stated that, because of their positions of great responsibility,
these directors could not assert an inability to discover the deficiencies even if they had conducted a reasonable investigation. 52
With respect to the comptroller, a nondirector signer of the registration statement, the court implied that he had a lighter overall
burden in proving due diligence because of his limited management role. 5 Despite this lower standard, the court found that the
comptroller failed to prove a reasonable belief in the validity of the
audit, a function of the corporation with which he was thoroughly
familiar.54 The court also apparently held BarChris' in-house counsel, a young, inexperienced attorney, to a lesser degree of care than
those with more responsibility despite his position as a director. 55
The court imposed liability, however, observing that he had attended all of the directors' meetings and thus should have been on
notice that the registration statement was not entirely complete
and accurate.5 6 The court imposed a similar, if not higher, standard of care on BarChris' outside counsel, the director who prepared the registration statement. Even though it expected the inhouse counsel to be more aware of BarChris affairs than his
outside counterpart, the court suggested that, because of his central role in preparing the registration statement, the outside attorney as a director should have undertaken a more affirmative investigation.5 7 In light of the circumstances, the court concluded that
the director failed to satisfy the standard of reasonable investigation and was therefore liable. Similarly, the court held the underdefense is known as the "due diligence" defense.
51. The court rejected the suggestion that the limited education or intelligence of certain defendants should mitigate their liability. The court observed, "Vitolo and Pugliese are
each men of limited education. It is not hard to believe that for them the prospectus was
difficult reading, if indeed they read it at all. But whether it was or was not is irrelevant.
The liability of a director who signs a registration statement does not depend upon whether
or not he read it, or if he did, whether he understood what he was reading." Id. at 684.
52. Id. at 684-85.
53. Id. at 685-86.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 686-87.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 690-92.
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writer-director liable for failing to perform an adequate investigation under the circumstances. He had delegated the investigatory
task almost entirely to his attorneys and had performed no personal investigation after becoming director. 58 Furthermore, he
faced liability both as a director and as an underwriter. 59
Finally, the court considered the duties of the two recently
elected directors who had no separate association with BarChrisY'
While the opinion acknowledged their position as true outsiders, it
emphasized the fact that these directors conducted virtually no independent investigation."1 Thus, the court imposed liability, but in
so doing it implied that these defendants could have satisfied the
due diligence requirement of reasonable investigation more easily
than any of the other directors.2
The importance of the BarChris decision for the purpose of
this analysis lies in its application of the "reasonable investigation"
requirement to different types of directors. The court clearly implied that it expected a different type of investigation from an active officer-director or professional director, such as the outside
counsel, than it did from the true outside directors. Reasonable investigation was a subjective standard tailored to each director's
professional duties and position with the issuer."3
In Feit v. Leasco Data ProcessingEquipment Corp.,4 which
also considered the question of directors' liability under section 11,
the court relied heavily on the BarChris analysis to impose liability
on the three directors concerned. Feit arose out of a tender offer
by Leasco for the Reliance Insurance Company in which Leasco
issued a prospectus allegedly containing material misstatements
and omissions.6 5 Plaintiff, a former Reliance shareholder who accepted the Leasco bid, brought a class action against Leasco, its
58.
59.

Id. at 692-97.
See Folk, supra note 25, at 39.

60. See note 49 supra. Auslander and Rose signed the signature page of the registration statement less than a month after being elected directors. 283 F. Supp. at 687-89.

61. Id.
62. Id.
63. The standard did not, however, take into account limited education or knowledge.
See note 51 supra.
64. 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
65. Leasco's primary interest in purchasing Reliance was to obtain control of the surplus funds that Reliance had collected from insurance premiums above the statutorily required surplus amount-the so-called "surplus surplus." Leasco, however, failed to indicate
the true purpose of the proposed acquisition and its estimate of the amount of the "surplus
surplus" funds available. Id. at 550-54.
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directors, and two underwriting firms.8 6 The three Leasco directors
named as defendants were the chief executive officer, the presi67
dent, and a partner in the law firm representing Leasco.

In his discussion of the directors' due diligence defense, Judge
Weinstein questioned whether it was appropriate to consider the
directors together or separately. 8 He noted with approval that
BarChris distinguished between inside and outside directors. Furthermore, he observed that BarChris held the outside attorney-director to "a very high standard of independent investigation of the
registration statement precisely because he was the registrant's
outside counsel." 9 Judge Weinstein then quoted a commentator's
opinion that "in some cases the attorney-director may be so deeply
involved that he is really an insider.

70

Based upon these observa-

tions, the Feit court held that Leasco's attorney was in fact an insider and therefore obligated to make an appropriately thorough
investigation. Even though the court considered all the directors
insiders, it stated that "[w]hat constitutes 'reasonable investigation' and a 'reasonable ground to believe' will vary with the degree
of involvement of the individual, his expertise, and his access to
the pertinent information and data. What is reasonable for one director may not be reasonable for another ....

",

Therefore, even

though Feit held all three directors liable as inside directors, it followed BarChris' flexible approach. The court assessed the adequacy of each director's investigation and belief in light of the director's duties.
B. Securities Exchange Act of 1934
As BarChris and Feit demonstrate, section 11 of the 1933 Act
requires directors to exercise a fairly high degree of care in order to
escape liability for false or misleading registration statements. The
duty of care, however, is appreciably lower for the same directors
in the preparation of annual reports and other filings made with
the Commission7 2 pursuant to the 1934 Act. Sections 12 and 15(d)
66. The plaintiff, alleging material misrepresentations and omissions, sued under sections 11, 12(2), and 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771(2) and 77q(a)
(1976), and sections 10(b) and 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§
78j(b) and 78n(e) (1976).
67. 332 F. Supp. at 575.
68. Id.

69. Id. at 575-76.
70. Id. (citing Folk, supra note 25, at 1).
71. Id. at 577-78.
72. L. Loss, supra note 44, at 3862.
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of the 1934 Act 7" require issuers of registered securities to file periodic reports with the Commission, such as Form 10-K annual reports. 74 Professor Loss describes liability under section 1875 for
false or misleading statements made in connection with any document filed under the 1934 Act as "a very much attenuated [section] 11."17 Although superficially similar to section 11, section 18
requires the plaintiff to prove that the misleading or false statement caused both the change in the price of the security and resulting damages and that the plaintiff relied on the statement."
Furthermore, section 18 omits the section 11 proviso that a plaintiff need not prove that he actually read the statement in order to
establish reliance." Finally, if the defendant merely proves that he
"acted in good faith and had no knowledge that such statement
was false or misleading,"7 he cannot be held liable. Thus, section
18 poses formidable barriers to recovery, and apparently in no reported decision has a plaintiff prevailed on a section 18 claim. 0
Due to the difficulties posed by section 18, plaintiffs began to
base their actions on the rather broad antifraud provisions of section 10(b)8 1 and rule 10b-5 2 promulgated by the Commission
thereunder. 8 Section 10(b) states that it shall be "unlawful" to engage in any deceptive or manipulative activity in connection with
the purchase or sale of a registered security and provides the Commission with rulemaking power to carry out that policy.8" Rule
73.

15 U.S.C. § 78m (1976).
INTRODUCTION TO SEcuRITms REGULATION 29 (1979).
75. 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1976).
76. L. Loss, supra note 24, at 1752.
77. 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1976).
78. See text accompanying note 39 supra.
79. 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1976).
80. L. Loss, supra note 24, at 1753 n.228; L. Loss, supra note 44, at 3863; [1979] 4
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 26, at 226.
81. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1976).
82. Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (1979).
83. The Second Circuit held recently in Ross v. A.H. Robbins, 607 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.
1979), that section 18 is not an exclusive remedy and that plaintiffs may avail themselves of
rule 10b-5 despite the concurrent applicability of section 18.
84. Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1976),
provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange-

74. PLI,

(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regula-
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10b-5 outlawd false statements, omissions, deceit, and fraud.

5

Neither the statute nor the rule states an intent requirement. Consequently, a severe split arose in the circuits concerning whether
negligence" or scienter 87 was the appropriate standard for a section 10(b) violation. 8 The Supreme Court finally resolved the majority of the intent questions in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder.9 In
Hochfelder plaintiff alleged that defendant accounting firm's negligence in conducting an audit permitted a fraud upon plaintiff to go
undetected.90 The Court held that scienter, not negligence, was the
level of intent necessary for actions under section 10(b) and dismissed the case. 1
The leading case on director liability under rule 10b-5 is
Lanza v. Drexel & Co.92 Although decided before the Supreme
Court resolved the intent question, the Second Circuit's conclusion
in Lanza on that point paralleled the Supreme Court's decision,
and Hochfelder cited Lanza with approval.9 3 Like BarChris,Lanza
arose out of the bankruptcy of the BarChris Construction Company, which left defrauded investors in its wake. BarChris induced
plaintiffs in Lanza to sell their interest in a billiard manufacturing
concern for BarChris stock on the basis of false and misleading
tions as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
85. Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1979), provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(1) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(2) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
86. See, e.g., white v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724, 730 (9th Cir. 1974); Myzel v. Fields, 386
F.2d 718, 735 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319
F.2d 634, 637 (7th Cir. 1963).
87. See, e.g., Clegg v. Conk, 507 F.2d 1351, 1361-62 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422
U.S. 1007 (1975); Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1306 (2d Cir. 1973).
88. Courts have interpreted section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to contain an implied private
cause of action. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975); Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406
U.S. 128, 150-54 (1972).
89. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
90. Id. at 188-90.
91. Id. at 214-15.
92. 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973).
93. 425 U.S. at 214.
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financial data, including the BarChris annual report.9 4 The district
court, finding that the president, vice president, and treasurer directors acted with extreme recklessness or actual knowledge in giving plaintiffs false and misleading financial data, imposed liability
under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5. " The district court, however,
exonerated Coleman, a partner in the underwriting firm, and Ballard, the firm's attorney, both of whom were outside directors.9"
Plaintiffs appealed from the court's holding that Coleman's actions
97
did not constitute a violation of rule 10b-5
The court of appeals focused on the standard of care historically required of an outside director and the level of care mandated by section 10(b) of the 1934 Act. The court concluded that
the common-law rule did not require that a director personally satisfy himself of the accuracy of the corporation's financial statements. To support its conclusion, the court observed that Congress
expressly imposed such an obligation under section 11 with respect
to disclosures pursuant to the 1933 Act but elected not to use the
same language to police 1934 Act disclosures. Therefore, the court
held that section 10(b) required a showing of scienter, which plaintiffs had failed to establish.9 8 Thus, in view of the scienter standard that arises under 10b-5 and the apparently insurmountable
problems that section 18 presents, it is clear that disclosure requires considerably less of directors under the 1934 Act than it
does under the 1933 Act.
C. Indemnification, Insurance, and Contribution
Issues that naturally arise following the imposition of liability
under either the 1933 Act or the 1934 Act include whether the defendant director may be indemnified by the issuer and whether the
director may seek contribution from the other tortfeasors. A related question is whether a defendant may obtain insurance
against any securities acts liabilities.
The right of an officer or director to indemnification for litiga94. 479 F.2d at 1280-84.
95. Lanza v. Drexel & Co., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. RFP. (CCH)
92,826 at 90,089, 90,101-03 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). The court also imposed liability on the president as a controlling person under § 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 784(a)
(1976). Id.

96. Lanza v. Drexel & Co., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
92,826 at 90,101, 90,104-06 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
97. Drexel & Co., the underwriter, and defendant Kircher also appealed because of the
court's denial of a jury trial. 479 F.2d at 1280-81.
98. Id. at 1306-09.
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tion expenses or for liability is generally a matter of state law. 9
Although there are a variety of state regulatory statutes on the
subject, the majority of statutes are based on section 5 of the revised Model Business Corporation Act.100 That section permits indemnification by the issuer provided the indemnitee acted in good
faith and in a manner reasonably believed to- be in or not opposed
to the best interests of the corporation.'' With the exception of
Delaware, all of the statutes based upon the Model Act omit the
clause permitting indemnification for actions that were "not opposed to" the best interests of the corporation. This omission requires the indemnitee to establish affirmatively that he was acting
in the best interests of the corporation. 02
Despite the state statutes, the legality of indemnification of
defendants sued under the federal securities laws is uncertain. The
Commission has long contended that under many circumstances
03
indemnification violates public policy and should be prohibited.
In order to enforce its policy, the Commission requires that the
registrant waive all indemnification claims. Alternatively, as a prerequisite to acceleration of the registration statement, the registrant must state that, in the Commission's opinion, indemnification is against public policy and therefore unenforceable. The
registrant must also agree to submit any indemnification claim by
an unsuccessful defendant to an appropriate court for a determination of the public policy question and must agree to be bound by
the result.10 4 In a somewhat contradictory fashion, however, the
Commission accepts the use of liability insurance. The potential
defendant may protect himself with liability insurance instead of
an indemnification provision without subjecting himself to the preacceleration agreement regardless of whether the corporation buys
99. R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 129 (4th
ed. 1976).
100. W. KNEPPER, LIABI.rrY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS 1 19.04 at 591-92
(3d ed. 1978).
101. Section 5(a) of the Model Act states: "The corporation shall have the power to
indemnify any person . . . by reason of the fact that he was a director, officer . . . if he

acted in good faith and in a manner reasonably believed to be in or not opposed to the best
interests of the corporation. . . ." MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 5(a) (2d ed. 1971).
102. W. KNEPPER, supra note 100, at 597.
103. Comment, Indemnification of Directors for Section 11 Liability, 48 TEx. L. REv.
661, 669-70 (1970).

104. Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 460 Note (a); 17 CFR § 230.460 Note
(a) (1979). This requirement, known as the "Johnson & Johnson formula" was first introduced on an informal basis in 1944. Kroll, supra note 44, at 689.
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the policy. 10 5 Accordingly, in response to BarChris and other similar cases, corporations in the late 1960's increasingly began to
purchase liability insurance.108
Although liability insurance is acceptable to the Commission
as an alternative to indemnification, the price of insurance in recent years has placed it beyond the means of many corporations.
Even for those companies that can afford it, the insurance, if avail107
able at all, may have a high deductible and low total coverage.
Furthermore, Lloyd's of London recently introduced a new standard insurance policy that clarified a number of ambiguous provisions in favor of the insurer, diminishing further the limited and
expensive protection available.1 08 Therefore, because economic realities may render liability insurance inadequate, it becomes quite
important to determine the extent to which courts, notwithstanding Commission policy, will permit indemnification.
Unfortunately, the status of indemnification is unclear. The
cases prohibiting indemnification define the outer limits, but the
issue of whether directors in a BarChris or Feit setting may be
fully indemnified remains unresolved. The first case to confront
the indemnification issue was Globus v. Law Research Services,
Inc. [Globus I].109 In Globus I the jury found that defendants-the
corporation, its president, and the underwriter-had actual knowledge of material misstatements and omissions in connection with
the sale of stock.110 The jury, however, also determined that the
underwriter could recover on its cross-claim against the other defendants for indemnification pursuant to the underwriting agreement.1 The trial court, rejecting the jury decision, rendered a
judgment n.o.v., holding that contracts for indemnification are invalid if the indemnitee had actual knowledge of the false and mis105. W. KNEPPER, supra note 100, at 596 n.46a.
106. Kroll, supra note 44, at 685-87.
107. Bishop, UnderstandingD & 0 Insurance Policies, HAV. Bus. REV., Mar.-Apr.
1978, at 20; Kroll, supra note 44, at 686-87; 55 ALI PROCEEDINGS 357-58 (1978) (remarks of
Mr. Eldon Olson).
108. Bishop, supra note 107, at 30. For a section by section analysis of the new Lloyd's
form, see Hinsey, The New Lloyd's Policy Form for Directors and Officers Liability Insurance-An Analysis, 33 Bus. LAw. 1961 (1978).
109. 287 F. Supp. 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), modified, 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970).
110. Plaintiffs sued under sections 12(2) and 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15
U.S.C. §§ 77(R)(2), 77q(a) (1976) and sections 10(b) and 15(c) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78o(c) (1976). 287 F. Supp. at 191.
111. Id.
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leading statements. 112 Emphasizing that the underwriter's actions
constituted "a sin graver than ordinary negligence," and relying
heavily on the deterrence policy of the securities laws, the court of
appeals affirmed the denial of indemnification."13 The Second Circuit's analysis of the in terrorem policy of securities regulation,
which the court feared indemnification would circumvent, was
based largely on section 11 of the 1933 Act, notwithstanding the
fact that Globus was not a section 11 suit." 4
Since Globus, a number of courts have prohibited indemnification if the defendant had intent or actual knowledge." 5 When the
defendant's conduct is merely negligent, however, the decisions are
less clear. In Feit, for example, defendant corporation in effect
sought to indemnify its three directors by paying the entire
$330,000 judgment."" The Commission opposed the corporation's
motion, arguing that indemnification was contrary to the policy of
section 11 of the Securities Act. 1' The court ultimately permitted
the directors to pay five thousand dollars each to the corporation
in settlement of any contribution claims that the corporation had
against them."" This comparatively small sum amounted to substantial indemnification by the corporation.
Four years later, in Odette v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 1"' a
court in the same district, without mentioning Feit, extended the
Globus I prohibition of indemnification for knowing or intentional
securities law violations to cover negligent violations as well. In
Odette plaintiff sued Shearson, Hammill & Co. under the 1933 and
the 1934 Acts for the sale of securities of a subsidiary while in the
possession of material adverse information concerning the subsidiary. 2 1 Shearson, Hammill alleged that it had also been deceived
112. Id. at 199.
113. The court explicitly acknowledged that the instant action was not based on section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, but relied on its rationale nonetheless. 418 F.2d 1276,
1288-89 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970).
114. Id.
115. See Alexander & Baldwin, Inc. v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 385 F. Supp.
230, 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 378 F.
Supp. 112, 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Tucker v. Arthur Anderson & Co. [1973-1974 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 94,544 at 95,868 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
116. Bishop, New Problems in Indemnifying and Insuring Directors: Protection
Against Liability Under the Federal Securities Laws, 1972 DuKE L.J. 1153, 1162.
117. Id. (citing Brief for S.E.C. as Intervenor, Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971)).
118. Id. at 1164.
119. 394 F. Supp. 946 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
120. Id. at 949.
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and sought indemnification from the bank that allegedly falsified
records in order to misrepresent the subsidiary's financial position.12 1 The court acknowledged that the Globus court had empha-

sized that it was basing culpability on more than ordinary negligence,122 but the Odette court held that Shearson's mere
negligence in failing to discover the bank's fraud was sufficient to
bar indemnification.1 2 3 As in Globus, the Odette court relied heav-

ily on the policy of deterrence underlying the liability provisions of
the federal securities laws and concluded that indemnification
14
would thwart that policy.
Odette is the most recent case to consider the indemnification
issue. Thus, the trend, although not yet confirmed by a higher
court, seems to be toward denying indemnification for liability
flowing from negligent violations of the securities laws.1 25 It is clear

after Globus that courts prohibit indemnification for willful or

knowing wrongdoing. 126 Consequently, directors may not be indem-

nified for liability under the 1934 Act standard of scienter for false
or misleading statements in annual reports. Whether the same directors may be indemnified for negligent conduct in connection
with a misleading or incomplete registration statement under the
1933 Act is less clear. The Code explicitly adopts the prohibition of
indemnification of defendants acting with scienter, but does not
consider indemnification in the context of a negligent violation;
thus, the latter question would remain open. As an alternative,
however, the Code does permit the use of liability insurance for
1
any type of conduct.

27

Issues closely associated with indemnification are whether the
law should permit contribution and, if so, whether nonsettling defendants can assert claims for contribution against those who set121. Id. at 953.
122. See note 113 supra and accompanying text.
123. 394 F. Supp. at 956-57.
124. Id. at 954-57.
125. See Gould v. American-Hawaiian Steamship Co., 387 F. Supp. 163 (D. Del. 1974),
vacated, 535 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1976); Sherlee Land v. Commonwealth United Corp., [19721973 Transfer Binder] FED. Sac. L. RaP. (CCH) 93,749 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). For cases that in
dicta suggest a contrary view, see Wassel v. Eglowsky, 399 F. Supp. 1330 (D. Md. 1975);
Muth v. Dechert, Price & Rhoads, 391 F. Supp. 935 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Gatter v. R.G. Dickinson & Co., 366 F. Supp. 559 (S.D. Iowa 1973). See also Note, The Role of Contributionin
Determining Underwriters'Liability Under Section 11 of the SecuritiesAct of 1933, 63 VA.
L. REv. 79, 87-89 (1977).
126. See, e.g., McLean v. Alexander, 449 F. Supp. 1251, 1266 (D. Del. 1978).
127. See note 188 infra and accompanying text.
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tle. Section 11(f) of the 1933 Act' clearly permits contribution
among joint tortfeasors; therefore, with respect to director liability
under section 11 the contribution question is settled. In extending
section 11's allowance of contribution to actions based on other
sections, the Odette court reasoned that the deterrence objectives
of the 1933 Act would be thwarted if joint tortfeasors did not face
liability through contribution.' 29 The Odette court on this point
drew support from Globus 11,130 the sequel to Globus L In Globus
If the court, using a deterrence rationale, held that the underwriter, having paid the judgment in full, could seek contribution
from its fellow defendants, the president and the corporation.'
Although it is plain that contribution under section 11 is both
permitted and desirable,' 3 2 it is unclear whether a nonsettling defendant can require contribution from parties to a good faith settlement.'3 3 Only two courts have squarely faced this issue.' 3 In
Altman v. Liberty Equities Corp. 3 5 three of the twelve defendants
in a class action suit under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act proposed
a $285,000 settlement of claims that approached $1,000,000. Although the remaining defendants agreed that the amount was reasonable, they asserted that the settlement should in no way impair
their right to seek a subsequent contribution from the settling defendants in the event of an adverse judgment.'3 6 The court held
that a settlement embodying a bar to claims for contribution
would deny nonsettling defendants the right to assert such
claims-a right that the Globus II decision guaranteed.'
Three
128. Section 11(f) provides as follows:
All or any one or more of the persons specified in subsection (a) of this section shall be
jointly and severally liable, and every person who becomes liable to make any payment
under this section may recover contribution as in cases of contract from any person
who, if sued separately, would have been liable to make the same payment, unless the
person who has become liable was, and the other was not, guilty of fraudulent
misrepresentation.
15 U.S.C. § 77k(f) (1976).
129. 394 F. Supp. at 959.
130. Globus, Inc. v. Law Research Service, Inc., 318 F. Supp. 955 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
131. Id.
132. See Heizer Corp. v. Ross, 601 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1979).
133. Fischer, Contribution in 10b-5 Actions, 33 Bus. LAW. 1821, 1831 (1978).
134. Although the parties pleaded the issue in Wainwright v. Kraftco Corp., 53 F.R.D.
78 (N.D. Ga. 1971), the court did not squarely face the issue and refused to approve the
settlement on the basis of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e). 53 F.R.D. at 84.
135. 54 F.R.D. 620 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
136. Id. at 622.
137. Id. at 625.
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years later, in Muth v. Dechert, Price & Rhoads,515 another district
court considered the issue in the context of a section 10(b) class
action. Muth held that nonsettling defendants, who had no notice
of a settlement specifically entered without prejudice to them,
could sue for contribution. Although the conclusion seemed inevitable given the circumstances and terms of the settlement agreement, the court cited Altman in support of its decision." 9
Commentators have criticized the Altman-Muth approach as
directly contrary to the Uniform Contribution Among Joint
Tortfeasors Act and conducive to uncertainty that will discourage
the efficient resolution of suits through settlement. 140 Section
(4)(b) of the Uniform Act provides: "When a release or a covenant
not to sue or not to enforce judgment is given in good faith to one
of two or more persons liable in tort . . . [i]t discharges the
tortfeasor to whom it is given from all liability for contribution to
any other tortfeasor. ' 1 4 ' This statute plainly contemplates a right
to contribution in the absence of a settlement and protects the
rights of nonsettling defendants by requiring that any settlement
be given in good faith-a standard that is subject to judicial supervision. Therefore, the Altman-Muth rule is neither desirable nor
mandated by Globus IPs approval of a right to contribution. 42 Unfortunately, however, the Code ignores the problem of settling and
nonsettling defendants and thus appears to ratify by inaction the
Altman-Muth approach.

HI. THE CODE
A.

Director's Liability for Annual Reports

In the civil liability chapter, sections 1704 and 1705 of the
Code set forth the standard of care for directors in connection with
the various reporting requirements. 148 Section 1704 places liability
138. 391 F. Supp. 935 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
139. Id. at 939.
140. Fischer, supra note 133, at 1832-33.
141. UNIFORM CONTRmurnON AMONG JOINT TORTFEASoRs AcT § 4(b) (U.L.A.).
142. See notes 131-32 supra and accompanying text.
143. As discussed in note 20, supra, certain compromises, whether adopted by the ALI
or sent to Congress for consideration as separate proposals, may affect the current Code
provisions concerning civil liability for the filing of annual "10-K" reports. The main thrust
of these compromises is to adopt the § 1705-type liability provisions to the extent that the
defendant's burden of proof is satisfied if he establishes only lack of scienter rather than
lack of due care as in § 1704. This compromise appears designed to appease criticism that
applying the due diligence standard of § 1704 imposes an unduly harsh burden on directors.
Therefore, the compromise approximates the position espoused by Dean Ruder during the
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for false registration statements, offering statements, and annual
reports upon the following persons: first, the registrant; second, the
principal executive officer or officers, the principal financial officer,
and the principal accounting officer; third, every director; fourth,
every person named with his consent as about to become a director; fifth, every expert named with his consent with respect to
statements attributed to him; and last, every underwriter in the
case of an offering statement.1 4 Specifically, section 1704 applies
"on proof that an effective registration statement, an effective offering . . . or an annual report filed with the Commission under
section 602(a)(1), or any other report so filed and incorporated by
reference in any such filing (1) contained a misrepresentation or
(2) omitted a material fact or document required. ' '145 Section 1704
limits the defenses available to a nonexpert officer or director 46 to
the following: first, that the defect was corrected subsequently in a
well-publicized manner;14 second, that the plaintiff knew the actual facts or that the falsity was obvious;14 8 third, that the defendant resigned prior to the effective date of a registration or offering
statement and advised the Commission;14 9 fourth, that the registration or offering statement, or post-effective amendment, was
filed without his knowledge and that the Commission was advised;1 50 fifth, that "with respect to any part of the filing not purporting to be made on the authority of an expert . . the defendant, after reasonable investigation, reasonably believed" that the
statement was not defective;151 or last, that "with respect to any
part of the filing purporting to be made on the authority of an
expert . . . that the defendant did not reasonably believe" either
ALI debate. See text accompanying notes 171-73 infra. This Note, however, maintains that
this proposed compromise does not adequately resolve the questions raised by a consideration of civil liability for directors. Instead, as Part IV of this Note contends, the search for
an adequate solution should focus on distinguishing between inside and outside directors
and developing a relationship between the Code's liability provisions and its contribution
and indemnification provisions.
144. 1978 Draft, supra note 1, § 1704(b).
145. Id. § 1704(a). Section 602(a)(1) requires a registrant to file "whatever annual reports (with financial statements), quarterly reports, and other reports the Commission requires by rule." It is unclear from the language in § 1704 whether that section applies to all
§ 602(a)(1) reports, or only annual reports and reports incorporated in the annual report.
146. Expert defendants are treated separately with respect to imposition of liability
and defenses. 1978 Draft, supra note 1, §§ 1704(b)(5), (f)(3)(B).
147. Id. § 1704(d).
148. Id. § 1704(e).
149. Id. § 1704(f)(1).
150. Id. § 1704(f)(2).
151. Id. § 1704(f)(3)(A).
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that the expert's statement was defective or that the filing did not
accurately reflect the expert's statement. 15 2 Quite obviously, section 1704 defenses closely parallel those in section 11 of the 1933
Act, particularly the "after reasonable investigation, reasonably believed" language. The Code, however, goes beyond section 11 and
lists the factors that a court should consider in the reasonableness
evaluation:
In determining what constitutes reasonable investigation or care and reasona-

ble ground for belief... the standard of reasonableness is that required of a
prudent man under the circumstances in the conduct of his own affairs. Relevant circumstances include, with respect to a defendant other than the registrant, (1) the type of registrant, (2) the type of defendant, (3) the office held
when the defendant is an officer, (4) the presence or absence of another relationship to the registrant when the defendant is a director or proposed director, (5) reasonable reliance on the officers, employees and others whose duties
should have given them knowledge of the particular facts (in light of the
functions and responsibilities of the particular defendant with respect to the
registrant and the filing) . . . and (7) whether, with respect to a fact or document incorporated by reference, the particular defendant had any responsibility for the fact or document at the time of the filing from which it was
incorporated.15

In recommending this subjective approach to the reasonableness
standard the Code adopts the BarChris and Feit approach"M and
eliminates the danger under section 11155 that an objective application of the standard might apply to all defendants. 151 Section 1704

limits damages to the greater of $100,000, one percent of gross annual revenues up to $1,000,000, or the profit on a related securities
transaction, unless the misrepresentation was made with know157
ledge, in which case liability is unlimited.
As mentioned previously, the most radical and controversial
aspect of section 1704 is its breadth. The section includes within
its scope annual reports, perhaps other section 602(a) reports, 15
and reports filed with the Commission that are incorporated by
reference into the 602(a) report. The opponents of this section proposed the application of section 1705 standards of liability for false
152. Id. § 1704(f)(3)(C).
153. Id. § 1704(g).
154. See text accompanying notes 47-71 supra.
155. Section 11(c) of the 1933 Act provides: "In determining what constitutes reasonable investigation and reasonable ground for belief, the standard of reasonableness shall be
that required of a prudent man in the management of his own property." 15 U.S.C. § 77k(c)
(1976).
156. See text accompanying notes 51 and 68-71 supra.
157. 1978 Draft, supra note 1, § 1708(c).
158. See note 146 supra.
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and misleading annual reports instead. 1 59 As presently drafted, sec-

tion 1705 is a residual section that provides plaintiffs with a cause
of action against the registrant for misrepresentations made with
"scienter" in any filing not covered by section 1704.160 By definition, "scienter" is satisfied if "[the defendant] knows that he is
making a misrepresentation (or a misrepresentation is being made)
or acts in reckless disregard of whether that is so."1 ' Section
287(a) defines "knowledge" in the following manner: "'Know' and
its derivatives are not defined. Their meaning is left to construction in context. But see the definition of 'scienter' in section
299.50. " 162 Section 1705 incorporates the same damage formula ap-

plied by section 1704.16s Thus, the liability limitations would apply
disregard," but
if the section 1705 defendant acted with "reckless
164
not if the defendant acted with "knowledge.'

In introducing section 1704 at the 1978 American Law Institute meeting, Professor Loss succinctly stated the issue that has
since plagued discussions of the Code: "With the center of the universe being shifted from the occasional Securities Act [of 1933] registration statement to the basic company registration statements
followed by.

.

. the 10-K [annual report], what do we do with civil

liability?"' 6 Professor Loss reported that all agreed that the new
company registration statement and offering statements should fall
under section 1704; similarly, there was unanimous agreement that
miscellaneous filings should be subject to section 1705.166 The conin
troversy focused on the appropriate standard of care required
67
the preparation of the annual report under section 602(a).1
The advocates of preserving section 1704 as drafted emphasized that a central function of the Code was replacement of the
sporadic disclosure accomplished by the 1933 Act with a system of
continuous annual reporting, which would inspire confidence in the
secondary trading market. That confidence, asserted the advocates,
159. 55 ALI PROCEEDINGS 352 (1978) (remarks of Dean David Ruder).
160. 1978 Draft, supra note 1, § 1705(a).
161. Id. § 299.50.
162. Id. § 287(a).
163. See id. § 1708(d); text accompanying note 156 supra.
164. See id. §§ 299.50, 1705, 1708(c), 1708(d).
165. 55 ALI PROCEEDINGS 347 (1978) (remarks of Professor Louis Loss).
166. Id. at 348.
167. Section 602(a) requires every registrant to file with the Commission, to send to
every shareholder, and to publish all annual, quarterly, and other reports required by the
Commission in order to keep investors informed. 1978 Draft, supra note 1, § 602(a). Note
that although the Institute did not discuss the issue at the meeting, all § 602(a)(1) reports
arguably fall within the scope of § 1704. See note 145 supra.
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is essential to persuade investors to make their initial investment
in securities in the primary market. 6 8
In order to assure that registrants would faithfully carry out
their continuous reporting duty, the drafters chose the in terrorem
effect of civil liability. The proponents of the original draft repeatedly argued 6 9 that, although section 1704 was based on section 11,
it alleviated the potential harshness of section 11 by providing a
flexible standard of reasonableness.17 0 These members claimed that
this standard would protect directors who were not active participants in the corporation from being unjustly saddled with liability.
Dean Ruder led the opposition to section 1704 by contrasting
the liability of a director under the new section with liability under
section 18 of the 1934 Act. He noted that under the new section
the burden of proof invariably shifts from the plaintiff to the defendant. He also emphasized that the plaintiff need not prove that
he relied on the statement or that the defendant-director was in
any way personally responsible for the improper filing. Dean Ruder
suggested that the reasonable investigation standard was more difficult for a director to satisfy than a simple negligence standard.1 7 1
He proposed shifting all liability for the annual report to section
1705, which would require the plaintiff to prove knowledge or recklessness on the part of the defendant. 7 2 Dean Ruder's supporters
reiterated his concern that applying the due diligence standard to
defendants without an offsetting reliance requirement for plaintiffs
imposed an unduly harsh burden on directors. 178
After an extended discussion, Professor Painter proposed
shifting the liability of outside directors for annual reports from
section 1704 to section 1705 as a compromise. 7 4 Painter had discerned that the real concern of the dissenters was whether it was
wise to impose the heavy burden of due diligence on outside directors. He considered it unquestionable that the registrant itself, and
its principal executive, financial, and accounting officers, were appropriate subjects for section 1704 liability. 17 5 Professor Loss, however, countered that the drafters had already achieved the desired
168. 55 ALI PROCEEDINGS 359 (1978) (remarks of Mr. Milton Cohen).
169. Id. at 360, 372, 411, 412, 413, 422 (remarks of Professor Louis Loss, Mr. Milton
Cohen, Mr. Donald Schwartz, and Professor William Painter).
170. 1978 Draft, supra note 1, § 1704(g).
171. 55 ALI PROCEEDINGS 349-52 (1978) (remarks of Dean David Ruder).
172. Id. at 352.
173. See, e.g., id. at 355 (remarks of Professor Homer Kripke).
174. Id. at 370 (remarks of Professor William Painter).
175. Id.
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result by including in section 1704 a flexible definition of the reasonableness standard and by making a specific reference to the nature of the directorship in that definition. 176 The Ruder group, at
the other extreme, continued to object to standards that imposed
liability on either insiders or outsiders in the absence of causation
77
and reliance.1
After rejecting the compromise, the membership of the American Law Institute proceeded to vote on the Ruder proposal, failing
to approve the proposal by a vote of ninety-four to ninety-five. 17 8
In view of the clear lack of consensus, the membership agreed to
present the Code to Congress as drafted, along with bracketed language expressing Professor Painter's compromise on the unresolved issue. 1 " During the 1979 meeting, however, at Reporter
Loss' request the American Law Institute elected to take no position whatsoever on whether or not to apply section 1704 to annual
reports. Thus, Congress will decide to which defendants sections
1704 and 1705 will apply. 8 0
B. Indemnification, Liability Insurance, and Contribution
Although the question of liability insurance arose during the
discussion of section 1704, the only aspect that the American Law
Institute considered was the effect of that section and the associated liability limitations on the cost and availability of insurance.'18 An integrated treatment of section 1704 liability and the
extent to which those found liable would or should personally bear
the burden of liability was never suggested. In fact, an examination
of the Code sections dealing with indemnification, contribution,
and liability insurance raises the question of whether the drafters
even considered it.
The Code deals with indemnification, contribution, and liability insurance primarily in section 1724. Paragraph (d) of that section condones contribution, providing that "[a]ll liability under
this Code . . .is joint and several . . ,.8.
Under paragraph (f),
parties may agree to allocate liability among themselves, if done in
176. Id. at 372 (remarks of Professor Louis Loss).
177. Id. at 374 (remarks of Professor Homer Kripke).
178. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
179. 55 ALI PROCEEDINGS 402-16 (1978) (discussion and vote on the Painter
compromise).
180. See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
181. 55 ALI PROCEEDINGS 357 (1978) (remarks of Mr. Eldon Olson).
182. 1978 Draft, supra note 1, § 1724(d).
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a manner consistent with the Code's indemnification provisions. 183
Absent such an agreement, the paragraph vests the court with
broad discretion to allocate damages among joint tortfeasors in an
action for contribution.1 8 4 The Code does not, however, discuss
specifics, and it fails to resolve the problem of contribution among
settling and nonsettling defendants.
Indemnification receives more detailed attention, but the overall effect is less satisfactory than the treatment of contribution.
Section 2003(b)(2)1 85 prohibits the Commission's traditional practice of refusing to accelerate a registration statement until the registrant agrees to subject its indemnification agreements to court
approval. Instead, the Code specifically authorizes the Commission
to bring an action to prevent contribution or indemnification not
required or authorized by section 1724(e) or (f).186 Section 1724 authorizes indemnification only to the extent that it is not prohibited
by a Commission rule or by a court applying federal common
law.187 Although the Code limits the apparent elasticity of this rule
by proscribing indemnification if bad faith, intentional misfeasance, or recklessness are involved, 88 it does not state whether the
registrant may directly indemnify a defendant for negligent liability. Therefore, the uncertain status of indemnification for negligence after Globus I, Feit, and Odette remains unresolved under
the Code.
Section 1724(e) explicitly condones the use of liability insurance as an alternative to indemnification. Furthermore, the Code
permits insurance irrespective of any state law to the contrary and
regardless of who pays the premium. 189 Thus, the Code specifically
preempts any state law prohibiting liability insurance.
With the exception of the rules governing insurance, the Code
seems to codify rather than resolve the existing uncertainty in
183. Id. § 1724(f)(1).
184. Id. § 1724(f)(2).
185. Section 2003(b)(2) states that, "The Commission may not refuse to accelerate the
effective date of a filing solely because of the terms of an indemnification or contribution
provision, whether contained in a statute, a bylaw or similar instrument, or a contract."
1978 Draft, supra note 1, § 2003(b)(2). See also notes 103-05 supra and accompanying text.
186. Section 1819(k) provides that, "The Commission may bring an action or intervene in any action in order to prevent indemnification or contribution not required or authorized by section 1724(e) or (f)." 1978 Draft, supra note 1, § 1819(k).
187. Id. § 1724(e)(3).
188. Id. § 1724(e)(5). Although this section permits insurance coverage for liability
arising from bad faith, willful acts and recklessness, such coverage, as a practical matter,
cannot be purchased. See note 108 supra.
189. 1978 Draft, supra note 1, § 1724(e)(4).
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what one commentator called "this sensitive but seldom adjudicated area of securities litigation.' 190 In fact, the explanatory notes
suggest that uncertainty was precisely the effect that the drafters
hoped to achieve. Note 2 states in part: "Nothing in the Code,
however, prevents a management from indemnifying either pursuant to some sort of provision or voluntarily, without the benefit of
a rule [promulgated by the Commission] 191 or a precedent [under
federal common law], 192 if state law permits and management is
willing to risk a stockholder's derivative action as well as an SEC
action. . ."I that will put its payment to the test ... after all."11'4
Under the Code, therefore, until controlling precedent or a Commission rule conclusively establishes the validity of indemnification
and clearly distinguishes conduct that is and is not indemnifiable,
every indemnification will be subject to challenge.
C. Interface Between Section 1704 and Section 1724
It is disappointing that neither the drafters nor the American
Law Institute membership chose to confront the indemnification
and contribution issues. Possibly the intensity of the debate over
section 1704 liability led the Reporter to reconsider any thoughts
he may have had about strong Code positions on other sensitive
points. Nonetheless, it is surprising that the discussion of section
1704 did not include an analysis of the interaction of that section
with section 1724's contribution and indemnification provisions.
The relationship between the imposition of liability and the identity of the person who ultimately bears the burden of paying damages is particularly relevant when liability is imposed in order to
achieve an in terrorem effect. Likewise, in evaluating the fairness
and possible repercussions of holding a particular individual or
class liable, it is quite important to consider whether the subject of
the liability will be required to pay damages from personal resources or will, in fact, be only nominally liable because of indemnification. Thus, both sides of the section 1704 debate should have
190. Mathews, A.L.L Proposed Federal Securities Code: Part XV-Administration
and Enforcement, 30 VAND. L. REv. 465, 545 (1977).
191. The Commission's rulemaking authority under this section is provided in §
1724(e)(3)(A).
192. Section 1724(e)(3)(B) permits courts "in accordance with the principles of common law and equity, applied as a matter of federal jurisprudence without regard to the
statutory or other law of any State" to determine the validity of indemnification provisions.
1978 Draft, supra note 1, § 1724 (e)(3)(B).
193. See note 185 supra and accompanying text.
194. 1978 Draft, supra note 1, § 1724(e), Note 2 at 617.
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been especially concerned with the Code position on indemnification. The proponents of section 1704 argued that the Code must
base liability upon failure to make a reasonable investigation in
order to achieve an in terrorem effect that would assure accurate
disclosure. 195 The opponents countered that this standard would
unreasonably force directors to bear such a high liability risk that
96
corporations would have difficulty recruiting outside directors.
Neither group, however, considered section 1704 in conjunction
with section 1724. If they had considered the relationship between
the two sections, both groups would have found the uncertain effect of section 1724 on directors' liability for disclosure disturbing.
The advocates of a strong in terrorem effect would recognize
that, by expressly sanctioning the use of liability insurance for any
conduct and by failing to explicitly prohibit direct indemnification
except in cases of egregious conduct,1 97 the membership threatened
the deterrent value of section 1704 liability. Furthermore, although
the notes point out that any corporation choosing to indemnify one
of its directors runs the risk of Commission intervention or a
shareholder's derivative suit, the risk is not as great as the notes
suggest. Under the Code, the Commission may no longer require
the registrant to submit its indemnification agreements to a court
for a determination of legality. 19 8 Moreover, absent a provision in
the charter or by-laws, there is no requirement that the corporation notify its shareholders that it has indemnified an individual. 199
Therefore, an indemnification could easily pass unnoticed and
unchallenged. 200
Section 1704's opponents will probably find section 1724 just
as discomforting as the proponents. Although the Code expressly
permits liability insurance even for acts of intentional misfeasance,
as a practical matter this type of coverage will not be available. In
fact, under the present system the coverage available for negligence liability is already expensive and difficult to obtain.2 1 Sev195. See, e.g., 55 ALI PRocUDINGs 359 (1978) (remarks of Mr. Milton Cohen).
196.
197.

See, e.g., id. at 366 (remarks of Mr. Fred Fishman).
1978 Draft, supra note 1, § 1724(e). See notes 187-88 supra and accompanying

text.
198. See note 185 supra and accompanying text.
199. One commentator stated that, to the best of his knowledge, General Motors was
the only corporation that required stockholder notice of indemnification payments. Bishop,
Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification of CorporateDirectors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1079-80 (1968).
200. See generally id. at 1079-80.
201. See notes 107-08 supra and accompanying text.
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eral American Law Institute members suggested that with the
Code's stricter standards, and in spite of its liability limitations,
insurance would become even more costly, difficult to obtain, and
limited in scope.20 2 Thus, many defendants will of necessity be
forced to rely at least partially on direct indemnification by the
registrant. New Commission rules, the evolution of federal common law, or changes in state law, however, may foreclose this possibility at any time.203 Indeed, the Odette holding04 suggests that
federal common law may already be developing significant restrictions on the availability of indemnification for negligent conduct.
Finally, the opponents of section 1704 are likely to object to its
treatment of contribution. By ignoring the issues in Altman and
Muth, the Code does not permit defendants who reach a bona fide
settlement to foreclose an obligation to contribute to the damages
assessed against a nonsettling defendant. 20 5 Therefore, settlements

will be a less attractive alternative to trial, and in all probability,
litigation costs will be higher for directors under the Code than
they would be under the Uniform Contribution Among Joint
Tortfeasors Act system.20 6
Clearly any revision of the indemnification, insurance, and
contribution provisions will have a direct impact on the liability
provisions of section 1704, which proved to be so divisive. This impact creates the possibility of causing more dissension and disunity
in a Code that the Reporter feels must have the unified support of
the bar if it is to succeed in Congress. 207 Despite these dangers, it is
possible that by restructuring the indemnification and contribution
paragraphs of section 1724 the American Law Institute could also
achieve a compromise on section 1704 liability. Any revision should
begin with the premise that indemnification conflicts directly with
the policy of deterrence and should be permitted only if necessary
to mitigate an unduly harsh result. From a deterrence or in terrorem standpoint the source of payment-whether through indemnification by the registrant or from liability insurance-is irrelevant. This deterrence policy rationale was the basis of the court's
202. 55 ALI
203.
204.
205.
206.

See
See
See
See

PROCEEDINGS

notes
notes
notes
notes

191-92
119-24
182-84
140-41

357-58 (1978) (remarks of Mr. Eldon Olson).

supra and
supra and
supra and
supra and

accompanying
accompanying
accompanying
accompanying

text.
text.
text.
text.

207. Remarks of Professor Loss, Meeting of the ABA Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, Chicago, Ill. (Oct. 13, 1978), summarized in MINUTES OF THE MEETING at
29 (1978).
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decision in both Globus and Odette. 0 8 Whether mitigating factors
should have weighed more heavily in those decisions, it seems unassailable that both indemnification and insurance undercut any
deterrent effect. For similar policy reasons, the law should permit
and encourage contribution so that no defendant escapes liability.
IV.

PROPOSED CHANGES

In recognition of the effect that indemnification and insurance
have on deterrence, the American Law Institute should amend section 1724 to prohibit techniques that ease the burden of liability
for section 1704 defendants, with modification in only a few specific cases. This prohibition should apply to both indemnification
and liability insurance. In conjunction with the elimination of indemnification and insurance, the drafters might consider a reduction in the $100,000 liability limit in view of the certainty that the
burden of damages will fall on the defendants personally.
Naturally, if the drafters adopt this proposal, section 1704 will
be even less acceptable to the ninety-four American Law Institute
members who voted in favor of the Ruder position. In order to
meet their criticism that section 1704 places an undue burden on
outside directors, 0 9 the drafters should modify the ban on reimbursement to expressly permit outside directors to recoup their
losses either through insurance or indemnification. The use of insurance would be preferable in order to properly balance the competing policies of compensation and deterrence. On the other hand,
indemnification is less desirable because it shifts the director's
damages directly to the shareholders, including perhaps the plaintiff. The Code should retain its section 1724 restrictions prohibiting indemnification for intentional acts, recklessness, or bad faith.
In light of high litigation costs, a defendant's actual expenses
in a section 1704 action may well exceed the current liability limit
of $100,000. That possibility is even greater if the drafters decrease
the liability limit, as this Note proposes. Thus, it is necessary to
further refine the ban on reimbursement to permit a defendant to
shift his litigation expenses as opposed to his liability for damages.
In this limited circumstance, therefore, the Code should expressly
permit the use of insurance contracts to fully fund the litigation
costs of any section 1704 defendant. In order to ease access to insurance for litigation expenses, the Code should adopt the Uniform
208. See notes 114 & 124 supra and accompanying text.
209. See note 196 supra and accompanying text.
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Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act rule on contribution between settling and nonsettling defendants. By making settlement a
more attractive alternative, this change would reduce litigation
costs, which would reduce the cost of insurance, and increase its
availability. Furthermore, such an approach would promote judicial economy.
The final issue that this proposal must consider is the definition of inside and outside director. At the 1978 Annual Meeting,
Professor Loss proposed defining an inside director as "an officer
or employee of, or who controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with, the registrant. 2 10 He defined outside directors
as all other directors. As a general rule this definition is appropriate, but if rigidly applied it overlooks the possibility that one who
fits the outside director definition may be acting with as much or
more influence and responsibility as an inside director. For example, in Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp.,211 the
court held that the registrant's outside counsel, though nominally
an outside director, was "so deeply involved that he was really an
insider. '212 In order to meet this problem, the Code could reasonably adopt Professor Loss' definition as an initial rebuttable presumption that could be overridden by proof that the individual in
question bore such a high level of responsibility that he was in fact
an insider. By establishing responsibility rather than knowledge or
awareness as the overriding criterion, the Code does not place the
outside director in the potentially contradictory position of having
acquired such a familiarity with the registrant in the course of his
statutorily required reasonable investigation that he becomes an
inside director without a right to indemnification.
V.

CONCLUSION

The proposed solution to the controversy surrounding civil liability under the Code and its relationship to indemnification, contribution, and insurance is not a panacea. It is not as neat as one
would desire, and it leaves questions unanswered, such as whether
the indemnification and contribution changes ought to apply beyond section 1704.213 Nevertheless, the proposal is internally consistent-an improvement over the Code's liability and indemnifica210. 55 ALI PROCEEDINGS 402 (remarks of Professor Louis Loss).
211. See note 64 supra and accompanying text.
212. See note 70 supra and accompanying text.
213. Sections 1724(d), (e)(2)-(5), and (f) apply to all liability arising under the Code,
not merely § 1704 liability.
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tion provisions. Furthermore, it has a sound policy basis, and it
attempts to meet the arguments of both sides of the American Law
Institute debate. In summary, the proposal is as follows:
(1) Define inside directors as those who are officers or employees of, or those who are controlled by or who control the registrant, and those persons whom the plaintiff proves to have such a
high level of responsibility in the registrant's operations that they
must be considered inside directors. Outside directors are all other
directors and those defendants who can prove that they bore such
insignificant responsibilities in the operation of the registrant that
they should be considered outside directors.
(2) Maintain sections 1704 and 1705 as drafted, but consider
lowering the liability limitations for individuals under section 1704
below $100,000.
(3) Prohibit indemnification and liability insurance for damages assessed against inside directors in section 1704 actions, but
permit insurance to fund litigation expenses unless the defendant
acted with scienter.
(4) Expressly permit indemnification and insurance for both
damages and litigation expenses of outside directors in section
1704 actions, unless the defendant acted with scienter.
(5) Adopt the Uniform Contribution Among Joint
Tortfeasors Act rule on contribution between settling and nonsettling defendants.
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